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CASE NOTES
ADOPTION OF WIFE AS CHWD-Legality of for Inheritance
Purposes.-The testatrix's will set up a trust for her son for life to
go to "his heirs at law" according to Law of Descent and Distribution
in force at time of his death. A codicil provided that if the son died
without "heirs"', the estate was to be divided between certain specified
charities. Before the death of the testatrix, her son married and fol-
lowing the death of testatrix, the son, being without children, adopted
his wife as "child and heir at law". This suit was brought to deter-
mine whether the adopted heir, the natural heirs, or the contingent
remaindermen were entitled to the trust corpus of $64,000. The Cir-
cuit Court upheld the validity of the adoption upon reviewing Ken-
tucky. adoption statutes which provided that "any adult person ...
may petition ... to adopt a child or another adult." HELD: Af-
firmed. The Court of Appeals by a 4-3 decision set aside the defenses
of fraud and violation of public policy As inadequate, thus enabling
the wife-daughter to inherit. Beditiger v. Graybill, - Ky. -, 302
S. W. 2d 594 (1957).
Since the English Courts had an inordinately high regard for blood
lineage, adoption was unknown to the common law and exists in
this country only by virtue of statutes. Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo.
456, 98 S. W. 585 (1906) ; Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S. C. 31, 64 S. E.
2d 19 (1951). However, adoption is of ancient origin. Genesis
41-:50, 52; 48:5, 14-20; Exodus 2:10. The history of adoption
shows its use not only to create a parent-child relationship, lit Re
Reichel, 148 Minn. 433, 182 N. W. 517, 16 A. L. R. 1016 (1921);
but also purely to enable one to inherit as adoptee. Greene v. Fit,-
patrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S. W. 896 (1927); Collamore v. Learned,
171 Mass. 99, 50 N. E. 518 (1898). Adoption statutes fall into three
general classes when denoting who may be adopted:
1. "Minor child". No question as to the adoption of an adult can
arise here. McCollister v. Yard, 90 Iowa 621, 57 N. W. 447 (1894);
Appeal of Ritchie, 155 Neb. 824, 53 N. W. 2d 753 (1952).
2. "Child". That only minors can be adopted under such statute
is not necessarily conclusive since that word has two generally under-
stood meanings: one signifying minority and the other a parent-child
relationship. A majority of the jurisdictions construe "child" as per-
mitting adoption of an adult. State ex rel. Buerk v. Calhoun, 330
Mo. 1172, 52 S. W. 2d 742, 83 A. L. R. 1393 (1932). The minority
view confines the meaning of "child" to minor. In Re Taggart, 190
Cal. 493, 213 Pac. 504, 27 A. L. R. 1360 (1923).
3. "Adult". These statutes clearly contemplate the adoption of an
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adult. E. g., KRS 405.390; IOWA ComE 600.1 (1954). If adop-
tion of an adult is valid, is an adoption of one's wife as a child against
public policy as creating an incestuous relation? Incest relates only
to blood relations. State v. Lee, 196 Miss. 311, 17 So. 2d 277, 151
A. L. R. 1143 (1944); State v. Youst, 75 Ohio App. 381, 59 N. E.
2d 167 (1943). Even if an adopted child were included in the incest
statutes, adoption of an adult purely for inheritance purposes effects
no change in either the social or domestic relationship; therefore
such adopted adult would be excluded from the incest statute. Green
v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S. W. 896 (1927).
In most jurisdictions it seems clear that a child may inherit from
his adoptive parents. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 262
(1936). An adopted child is included within the designation of an
heir or heir at law and may inherit through, as well as from, the
adoptive parent unless the contrary intention is shown from the
language of the will. Major v. Kammer, - Ky. -, 258 S. W. 2d
506 (1953); Blackwell v. Bowman, 150 Ohio 34, 80 N. E. 2d 493
(1948). However while adoption statutes denoting status of persons
are to be used in aid of the construction of a will, this cannot be al-
lowed to control or defeat the testator's true intent. Brock v. Dor-
man, 339 Mo. 611, 98 S. W. 2d 672 (1936); Lichter v. Thiers, 139
Wis. 481, 121 N. W. 153 (1909). Generally when a provision is
made in a will for children of some person other than the testator,
an adopted child is presumed not to be included. Coiner v. Comer,
195 Ga. 79, 23 S. E. 2d 420, 144 A. L. R. 664 (1942) ; In Re Miller's
Trust, - Mont. -, 323 P. 2d 885 (1957). Adoption subsequent to
the testator's death raises a grave presumption that the adoptee is
not to be included. Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149 Ati. 515, 70
A. L. R. 608 (1930); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Sack, 79
R. I. 493, 90 A. 2d 436 (1952). Since the decision in each case is
based upon a will with its own peculiar provisions and expressions,
the will must be viewed as a whole in the light of the surrounding
circumstances. Nicherson v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 343, 115 N. E.
588 (1917)
Under the broad and liberal adoption statutes of Kentucky this
situation may fall within the literal interpretation of the statute; yet
to uphold the validity of the adoption for inheritance purposes would
seem to thwart the testatrix's intention. To say that the testatrix
contemplated the possible adoption of children and to say that she
contemplated her son adopting his wife as a child are two different
propositions. Even the court had not anticipated the latter until the
instant case. The testatrix made the codicil thirteen days before the
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marriage of her son, apparently -with the event in mind. She had
ample opportunity to provide specifically for the wife if she had so
desired. However the equities of the particular case may have played
an important part in helping the court reach this decision. This
exact problem would not even arise in Kentucky today because of
an amendment to the statute, K R S 391.010 (1958) in 19S6, enabling
the spouse to inherit before grandparents and descendants. The
natural heirs in the instant case were only cousins. In South Car-
olinia under the wording of the present adoption statutes, and with no
cases strictly in point, seemingly only a minor can be adopted and
then such adopted child can inherit only from his adoptive parents,
and not through them.
DOROTHY COBB.
AUTOMOBILE - Guest Passenger Statute - Protest by Guest
Changes Status to Involuntary Passenger. - Plaintiff, lacking knowl-
edge of the reckless propensities of the defendant, accepted an invi-
tation to ride with him. Shortly after the trip commenced, defen-
dant began to drive improperly. Plaintiff protested and demanded
permission to leave the car, but the protests and demands, though
loudly and frequently reiterated, were ignored by defendant. An
accident subsequently occurred and plaintiff was injured. Action
ensued and the court allowed plaintiff to recover. HELD. Affirmed.
The plaintiff's demands terminated her status as a guest within the
meaning of the local guest statute, which bars recovery of all guests
except on a showing of the driver's gross negligence. She thereby
became an involuntary passenger to whom the defendant became
liable upon a showing of slight or ordinary negligence. Andrews v.
Kirk, 106 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1958).
The purpose and effect of the motor vehicle guest statute is to re-
lieve the host-owner or -operator of a vehicle from liability to a
gratuitous rider for injuries caused by the host's simple or ordinary
negligence. 'Bermnan v. Berman, 110 Conn. 169, 147 A. 568 (1929);
Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685, 131 A. L. R. 886
(1940); Manser v. Eder, 263 Mich. 107, 248 N. W. 563 (1933).
The term guest or passenger as used in these statutes signifies one
who rides with another, who confers no benefit on the driver other
than the pleasure of his company and who exercises no degree of
control or management over the vehicle in which he is riding. Peery
v. Mershon, 149 Fla. 395, 5 So. 2d 694 (1942) ; Holtsinger v. Scar-
brough, 69 Ga. App. 117, 24 S. E. 2d 869 (1943). To permit re-
[Vol. 11
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covery by an injured guest, the host's conduct must have been inten-
tional, grossly negligent, wilfull, wanton, heedless, or reckless, de-
pending on the language of the particular statute. Koger v. Hollahan,
144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685, 131 A. L. R. 886 (1940) ; Lee v. Lott, 50
Ga. App. 39, 177 S. R. 92 (1934) (Interpreted S. C. guest statute,
CODs or LAWS or SOUTEH CAROLINA, 1952, § 46-801; Taylor v. Taug,
17 Wash. 2d 533, 136 P. 2d 176 (1943)). Most courts hold that these
statutes, which are in derogation of the common law rule, should be
strictly construed, Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P. 2d 478
(1935) ; Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N. E. 2d 217 (1943),
and that their meaning should not be extended beyond the reason for
their enactment. Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 883
(1940). The relationship of guest and host ordinarily contemplates
an invitation and an acceptance, Rocha v. Hulen, supra, followed by
an overt act which manifests an intention to proceed with the journey.
Taylor v. Taug, supra. It follows that one forced to ride against his
will cannot be said to be riding as a guest. Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind.
App. 407, 31 N. R. 2d 670 (1941). To determine if an injured per-
son is a guest at the time of the injury, the decisive inquiry is whether
or not the accident occurred incidental to the original gratuitous
undertaking. Ethier v. Audette, 307 Mass. 111, 29 N. E. 2d 707
(1940); Donahue v. Kelly, 306 Mass. 511, 29 N. R. 2d 10 (1940);
Ruel v. Langelier, 229 Mass. 240, 12 N. E. 2d 735 (1938). A mere
protest against the manner of operation is insufficient to terminate
the host-guest relationship. Wachtel v. Block, 43 Ga. App. 156, 160
S. E. 97 (1931); La Plante v. Rosseau, 91 N. H. 330, 18 A. 2d 777
(1941). A protest coupled with a request for permission to leave
the car as a matter of convenience is also insufficient. Vance v.
Grohe, 223 Iowa 1109, 274 N. W. 902, 116 A. L. R. 332 (1937).
But when the passenger protests against the manner in which the car
is being operated and demands exit, and the driver ignores such de-
mands, the host-guest relationship is terminated. Anderson v. Wil-
liams, 95 Ga. App. 684, 98 S. E. 2d 579 (1957) ; Blanchard v. Ogle-
tree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S. E. 116 (1929) ; contra, Akins v. Hemphill,
33 Wash. 2d 735, 207 P. 2d 195 (1949); Taylor v. Taug, 17 Wash.
2d 533, 136 P. 2d 176 (1943).
To extend the meaning of a statute beyond the reason for its enact-
ment can result in a wholesale perversion of justice. The guest
statutes were designed to limit the liability of the host to one who is
riding with him as a guest. A guest is merely the recipient of the
voluntary hospitality of the host and does not obligate himself to go
the entire contemplated journey. He is entitled to be allowed to
1959]
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leave the automobile upon demand, and to have his guest-host re-
lationship with the driver then and there terminated, as the court held
in the instant case. By adopting any other view, a court would be
saying in effect that a person must sit idly by and submit to the
hazard of injury or death until the driver voluntarily releases him.
Grave consequences would follow the adoption of any suzh rule of
law.
KARL L. KNYON.
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-Automatic Coverage for Newly
Acquired Automobile-Interpretation of Condition of Notification.-
Plaintiff, a guest passenger, brought an action against the defendant
automobile owner and his liability insurance carrier for injuries su-
stained as a result of the owner's negligence. The defendant owner
had traded cars on October 31. The accident occurred on November
30, and notice of the accident involving the new car was given on
December 1 or 2. The defendant's liability policy contained a pro-
vision for "Automatic Insurance . . . for a Newly Acquired Auto-
mobile . . if the named insured notifies the company within thirty
days following the date of its delivery . . . ." On appeal from sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, HELD: Reversed and remanded
to determine whether the automobile was a replacement automobile
within the terms of the policy. The requirement that notice of the
newly acquired automobile be given within thirty days was a "con-
dition subsequent" and "[i]f an accident occurred within the thirty
day notice period the automobile will be deemed covered by such in-
surance irrespective of whether notice has been given or not." Offer-
dahl v. Glasser, 5 Wis. 2d 498, 93 N. W. 2d 362 (1958).
The provision for "automatic" coverage in the instant case is typi-
cal of that found in many automobile insurance policies. Most of
the cases turn on the determination as to whether or not the auto-
mobile for *hich coverage is sought falls within the definitions and
terms of policy coverage. See Annot., 34 A. L. R. 2d 936 (1952).
The automatic coverage provision is for the benefit of the insured.
Mindful of the fact that cars are constantly traded, replaced, and sub-
stituted, the obvious purpose is to provide continuous insurance in
the use and maintenance of newly acquired automobiles. Western
Cas. and Surety Co. v. Lund, 234 F. 2d 916 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Home
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rose, 150 F. 2d 201 (8th Cir. 1945). The require-
ment of notice is for the benefit of the insurer, to inform the company
[Vol. 11
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of the identity and character of the vehicle to be covered, to enable
it to exercise the rights reserved in the policy and to ascertain whether
the insured has complied with the obligations thereunder. Mitcham
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 127 F. 2d 27 (4th Cir. 1945). The cases gen-
erally agree that if an accident occurs after the designated notice
period and before notice has been given, there is no coverage. Mit-
chain v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Toney,
178 Va. 196, 16 S. E. 2d 34; 5A Am. Jua., Automobile Insurance
§ 84 (1956). But see Portland Cement Co. v. Southern Surety Co.,
225 Mo. App. 712, 39 S. W. 2d 434 (1931). The difficulty arises
when the accident occurs within the notice period but prior to the
giving of notice. The minority view is expressed in Jamison v.
Phoenix Indemnity Co., 40 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D. N. J. 1941): "There
is automatic coverage from the date of acquisition of the new car
only in the event that notice is given the insurer within 10 days."
The dissent in the instant case expressed the same view, 93 N. W.
2d 362, 364: "The words requiring notice are free from ambiguity
and mean what they say. Coverage is extended if the notice is given
as required, but not otherwise." Most cases, however, hold that the
insurer is liable for an accident occurring during the notice period
irrespective of notice. Western Cas. and Surety Co. v. Lund, supra;
Inland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stallings, 162 F. Supp. 713 (D. Md. 1958).
General Ins. Co. of Amer. v. Western Fire and Cas. Co., 241 F. 2d
289 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U. S. 909 (1957), states:
"The insurance automatically attaches on acquisition of a new vehicle
subject only to being defeated by failure to give notice within thirty
days. The intervention of an accident after acquisition but before
reporting does not vitiate the insurance." The language of these
cases indicates that, with regard to coverage during the notice period,
it is immaterial whether notice of the new acquisition is ever given.
It should be noted, however, that in most of these cases the notice,
although given after the accident, has nevertheless been given within
the notice period.
The case under discussion in quoting from 34 A. L. R. 2d 936,
944 (1952), and 5A Am. Ju., Automobile Insurance § 84, 83
(1956), states that the majority view is ". . .[t]he requirement of
notice is a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent
to extended coverage, that such coverage is automatically effected
upon delivery . ..and remains in effect until the end of the specified
period, irrespective of whether notice has been given or not." This
is expressed also in Williams v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 158 Cal. App.
506, 322 P. 2d 1026 (1958), and the leading case of Birch v. Harbor
19591
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Ins. Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d 714, 272 P. 2d 784 (1954): "The require-
ment of notice is a condition subsequent which must be completed in
order to keep such coverage in effect beyond that period."
The instant case reflects the result achieved by the majority view.
Although it might be argued that the requirement of notice is a con-
diton precedent rather than subsequent, it seems that the court has
chosen the latter term for procedural purposes in order to place the
burden of proving non-performance upon the insurer. It has thus,
in line with the majority, interpreted the provision so as to afford
truly automatic insurance during the notice period. The fact re-
mains, however, that to extend coverage to an accident occurring after
the period, notice must be given prior to such accident.
C. THOMAS COVIZLD.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure - Questioning of Defendant Before Arraignment. - Appellant
and accomplice were convicted of robbery in the U. S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. Approximately 30 minutes after his
arrest, the appellant confessed. Thereafter appellant and accomplice
were booked, photographed, and fingerprinted, and, about 30 minutes
after his confession, appellant was taken before a United States com-
missioner and arraigned. At the trial appellant objected to testimony
regarding his oral confession, arguing that it was obtained during an
unnecessary delay between his arrest and arraignment. The trial
court found no unnecessary delay and held the testimony admissible.
On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. Where approximately one hour had
elapsed between commencement of interview of appellant by police
officers and his arrival before the arraigning authority, there was no
such unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment as would
render his oral confession inadmissible. Heiderman v. United States,
259 F. 2d 943 (D. C. Cir. 1958).
In a society where the respect for the dignity of all men is central,
safeguards must be provided to protect the innocent from the over-
zealous application of the law enforcement processes. McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943). It was recognized in England
over 100 years ago that a constable arresting a person was bound to
take him before a magistrate as soon as he reasonably could. Wright
v. Court, 4 B. & C. 596, 107 Eng. Rep. 1182 (K. B. 1825). Under
the common law in this country when a defendant is arrested, it is
the duty of the arresting officer to bring him without delay before
[Vol. 11
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the court. Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 249 Mass. 273, 1 N. H. 2d
189 (1936) ; Tubbs v. Tukey, 3 Cush. 438, 50 Am. Dec. 744 (Mass.
1849). Federal legislation in 1894 tended to provide protection from
undue delay between arrest and presentation before a judicial officer:
"It shall be the duty of a marshal who may arrest a person . . . to
take the defendant before the nearest US Commissioner." 28 STAT.
416 (1894). FBI officers authorized to make arrests were also re-
quired to take the person arrested "immediately" before a commis-
sioner for arraignment, 48 STAT. 1008 (1934), and any conviction
resting solely on a confession obtained during an unnecessary delay in
flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure cannot be allowed to
stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in wilful
disobedience of the law. McNabb v. United States, supra. In order
to simplify the procedure, Congress passed legislation which pro-
vided: "An officer making an arrest . . . shall take arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner
.... " CRIMINAI, RuL.E 5(a), 62 STAT. 819, 18 U. S. C. § 3060
(1952). The purpose of this legislation is to protect and safeguard
the individual's rights without hampering effective and intelligent
law enforcement. Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957).
It also prevents the use of that reprehensible practice known as the
"third degree" in obtaining confessions. McNabb v. United States,
supra; Smith v. United States, 187 F. 2d 192 (D. C. Cir. 1950). De-
tention for the purpose of exacting or coercing a confession is deemed
unreasonable and prohibited by statute, Mallory v. United States,
supra; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948), and any con-
fession obtained during illegal detention is inadmissible in the Federal
courts, Carigtian v. United States, 341 U. S. 934 (1950) ; Garner v.
United States, 174 F. 2d 499 (D. C. Cir. 1949). But this rule does
not call for mechanical and automatic obedience. Mallory v. United
States, supra. It is recognized that in some instances the circum-
stances may dictate that there be some delay between arrest and ar-
raignment. Garner v. United States, supra; Akowskey v. United
States, 158 F. 2d 649 (D. C. Cir. 1946). By the phrase "take with-
out unnecessary delay", CRIMINAi, Ruri 5(a), supra, the statute
contemplates necessary delay, therefore, to say that defendant must
be taken without any delay would be to ignore completely the term
"unnecessary". Trilling v. United States, 260 F. 2d 677 (D. C. Cir.
1958); Garner v. United States, supra. In addition, every citizen
has a right to insist that the police make some definite inquiry before
he is arraigned. Metoyer v. United States, 250 F. 2d 30 (D. C. Cir.
1957). Therefore, an hour's lapse between, arrest and arraignment
19591
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is not a violation of CRIMINA, RuI 5(a). Heidentan v. United
States, 259 F. 2d 943 (D. C. Cir. 1958).
The decision in the principal case is sound. The court in exercis-
ing its function to protect the innocent as well as to punish the guilty
has been and should be strict in the interpretation of the rules of
procedure. It is of the very essence in a democratic society that one
arrested of a crime be taken without unnecessary delay before a court
official where he can learn of his rights and the crime of which he is
charged. To give the law enforcement branch of government the
power to hold one before arraignment in order to extract a confession
or question him extensively would be to resort to a medieval method
of law enforcement. Not only would it completely disregard the
functions and duties of the court to advise the individual of his rights,
but it would also deprive the individual of his rights under our demo-
cratic system of government. On the other hand, it would be just
as fatal to the rights of free men to require that they be taken auto-
matically and without any preliminary police investigation before
court officials and arraigned. If arraignment of all potential suspects
is required before any preliminary investigation whatsoever is made,
then the letter of the law is used to reduce an important and genuine
right to absurdity. Every citizen has the right to insist that the
police make some inquiry into his guilt or innocence prior to his ar-
raignment. If the courts deny a citizen this right, they destroy a
right which is fundamental and basic to all men under our system
of government.
0. HARRY BOZARID, JR.
INSURANCE - Wagering Contracts - Insured Carrying Several
Health Policies. - Insured was injured on April 29, 1957, and in-
curred medical bills of $1,077. An action was brought to recover
$1,000 under a "Hospital Expense Policy" issued twenty days
prior to the accident. Insurer prayed judgment for the re-
scission of the policy on the grounds that the obtaining of this and
numerous other policies constituted a wagering contract which is
contrary to public policy. It appears that one policy was issued in
1952, another in 1954, and that insured purchased eight additional
policies between March 25, 1957, and May 1, 1957. It was calculated
that the insured would receive approximately $745 per week should
he become hospitalized, whereas his gross weekly income amounted
to only $65. Upon solicitation by the agent of the insurer, plaintiff
[Vol. 11
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alleged that he informed the agent that he had all the insurance that
he needed, whereupon he was informed by the agent that he could
never have too much insurance. Insured further testified that he
informed the agent that he had several other policies. The trial judge
directed verdict for the insurer. A new trial was denied and plaintiff
appealed. HELD: Reversed and remanded for new trial on other
points not discussed on appeal. Obtaining numerous hospital in-
surance policies is not a wagering contract where none of the policies
contained clause prohibiting additional hospital insurance. Batckhelor
v. American Health Insurance Company .................... S. C .................
107 S. E. 2d 36 (1959).
An insurance policy is nothing but a contract between the insured
and the insurer, and in the absence of any fraud in connection with
the execution and delivery of the policy, both the insurer and the
insured are bound by the terms thereof. Op. Atty. Gen. 103 (1915).
A policy constitutes a contract, the provisions of which are binding
unless they have been waived or annulled for lawful reasons. Oren-
stein v. New Jersey Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 131 S. C. 498, 127
S. E. 570 (1925). Courts should not annul contracts on doubtful
grounds of public policy. In such matters it is better that the legis-
lature should first speak. Ellison v. Independent Life & Accident
Insurance Company, 216 S. C. 475, 58 S. E. 2d 890 (1950) ; Cross-
well v. Association, 51 S. C. 103, 28 S. E. 200 (1897). A wager
policy has been defined as a pretended insurance where the insured
has no actual interest in the thing injured and can sustain no loss by
the happening of the misfortunes which have been insured against..
29 AM. J OR. 290, Insurance § 319. A person cannot take out a valid
enforceable insurance contract for his own benefit on the life of one
in which he has no insurable interest, such contract being a mere-
wagering contract and contrary to public policy. Henderson v. Life,
Inls. Co. of Virginia, 176 S. C. 100, 179 S. E. 680 (1935). Every
person has an insurable interest in his own life and may lawfully-
procure insurance thereon for the benefit of any other person whose
interest he desires to promote, regardless of whether or not such
person has an insurable interest in his life. Bynum v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 77 F. Supp. 56 (1948); Warren v. Pilgrim
Health & Life Ins. Co., 217 S. C. 453, 60 S. E. 2d 891 (1950). The
insured has an unlimited insurable interest in his own life which is
sufficient to support the policy; and contracts of this character are
not contrary to public policy. 44 COpus JuRIs SnCUNDUm 899, In-
surance § 202. The insurer may validly provide against over insur-
ance, or require notice of any additional insurance taken. 5 API,-
19591
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MAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 146, § 3052 (1941). Public
policy does not prevent one from purchasing as many hospital expense
policies as one may desire. In the absence of policy restrictions, a
person having an insurable interest may insure such interest in what-
ever amount and in as many companies as he desires. CoDm ov LAWS
ov SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, §§ 37-471.19, 37-491. The purpose of
insurance is to protect the insured, who takes it out and pays for
it. Gentry v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., Limited, of York, England, 192
S. C. 125, 5 S. R. 2d 565 (1939).
As early as 1915 the Attorney General of South Carolina stated
that an insurance policy should be enforced in the same manner as
any other contract entered into in the absence of fraud. South Car-
olina has followed the prevailing rule and consistently held that courts
should not annul contracts on doubtful grounds of public policy but
should leave any changes in this area to the legislative branch of the
government. It is not clear how the lower court could have considered
the multiple insurance coverage as a wagering contract since a wager
has been defined as "one made when the insured has no insurable
interest." The view taken by our Supreme Court in the principal
case is clearly in accord with the majority of the courts in this
country today in holding that every person has an insurable interest
in his own life. By statutory enactment in South Carolina, a person
having an insurable interest may purchase, in the absence of policy
restrictions, as many hospital policies in whatever amount and in as
many companies as he may desire. If the insurer desired to limit
its liability, it could have included in its policy the provision for "pro
rata" coverage with other insurers as provided by the COD4 or LAWS
or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 37-471.19. Having failed to insert this
limitation in its policy, the insurer should be estopped to deny liability
on grounds of similar coverage with other insurance companies. In
the instant case the Supreme Court of South Carolina undoubtedly
reached the correct result in accordance with the equities of the situa,
tion. The purpose of insurance is to protect the insured and it
would be grossly inequitable to allow the insurer to reap the
benefits of collecting premiums and escape liability when an accident
or ill health occurs, especially when it has chosen to ignore the pro-
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Negligence - Duty to Protect
Informer After Threats to His Person. - The plaintiff, administrator,
brought an action against the city of New York for the wrongful
death of his intestate. The deceased, after seeing a fugitive's picture
on an FBI flyer, supplied information to the defendant's police de-
partment which led to the arrest of Willie Sutton, a dangerous crimin-
al. The capture was widely publicized and the plaintiff's intestate
immediately received threats to his life, of which he notified the police.
Three weeks later the deceased was killed on the street. The com-
plaint is drawn upon the theory that the deceased .was shot in conse-
quence of his part in the arrest of the criminal, that the city owes a
Special duty to protect those persons who have thus co-operated in
law enforcement, and that the city failed in its duty to the intestate
by not supplying him with sufficient police protection after their
knowledge of threats to his life. The Supreme Court, Special Term,
granted a motion by the city dismissing the complaint and the plain-
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed and
plaintiff appealed. HELD: Reversed. The Court of Appeals held
4 to 3 that the complaint stated a cause of action against the city for
breach of its duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of a
person in decedent's situation. Schuster v. City of New York, 5
N. Y. 2d 75, 154 N. E. 2d 534 (1958).
"The common-law rule denying liability of municipal corporations
in tort was an offshoot of the old maxim 'the king can do no wrong',
and its corollary that the sovereign may not be sued without its con-
sent." .Pans v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E. 203, 89 A. L. R.
387 (1933) ; Mullins Hospital v. Squires, 233 S. C. 186, 104 S. E. 2d
161 (1958). In New York, however, this common-law rule has been
changed by a statute which waives the state's immunity from liability
in tort. N. Y. L., C. 860, § 8 (1939). This amendment has been
construed by the courts to be a waiver of immunity for the city as
well as the state. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N. Y. 99, 71
N. E. 2d 419 (1949); Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N. Y. 51, 64
N. E. 2d 704, 163 A. L. R. 342 (1945). Even after this waiver of
immunity statute, however, the courts have been reluctant to impose
liability on municipal corporations. They have applied the trouble-
some distinction between "governmental" and "propriety" functions
and have established that a municipality is answerable for the negli-
gence of its agents in exercising a proprietory function, and liable
at least for their negligent acts of commission in exercising a govern-
mental function; but that a municipality is not liable for acts of
omission in the exercise of a governmental function,. such as failure
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to provide police and fire protection. Murrain v. Wilson Line, 296
N. Y. 845, 72 N. E. 2d 29 (1947) ; Steitz v. City of Beacon, supra.
The municipality could also avoid liability on the ground that the
action was based on a duty which did not run to the plaintiff indi-
vidually but was owing to the public generally. Steitz v. City of
Beacon, supra. This, of course, conforms with the fundamental
principle of tort law that one who seeks redress at law for personal
injuries must show that there was a duty owed to him, a negligent
violation of that duty, damage to his person, and that the injury was
reasonably foreseeable. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248
N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253 (1928). The duty of
New York City is set forth by its charter, which clearly places the
police force of the city under a broad duty to protect the general public
from crimes, including homicide. New York City Charter, Sec. 435
(1938). The modern trend seems to hold a municipality liable if
the plaintiff can prove a duty owed to a special group of persons of
which the plaintiff is a member, and a violation of that duty.
O'Grady v. City of Fulton, 4 N. Y. 2d 717, 148 S. E. 2d 317 (1958) ;
Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N. Y. 2d 445, 151 N. E. 2d 862
(1958) ; Slavin v. State, 249 App. Div. 72 (1936). Such a duty on
the part of government to persons aiding in law enforcement is
recognized by section 1848 of the Penal Laws, CoNsoL. LAws, C. 40,
N. Y. That section creates an absolute liability against municipal
corporations for damages arising from the personal injury or death
of persons who at their direction aid officers in making arrests. Riker
v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 808, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 620
(1953); Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corpoiation, 224 App. Div. 794,
164 N. R. 726 (1928). "The remedy supplied by that section is not
available to plaintiff, but the care and solicitude which it manifests
toward those who aid in law enforcement dispels any inference that
the public policy of the State is the other way." Schuster v. City of
New York, 5 N. Y. 2d 75, 154 N. R. 2d 534 (1958). When it can
be shown that the municipality had actual or constructive notice of
the potential harm which an individual would suffer if it were negli-
gent in performing its duty of protection, then the duty is one which is
owing to the individual, and liability can be imposed for negligence.
Lubelfeld v. City of New York, supra; Slawin v. State, supra. "The
majority opinion enunciated the rule that the public owes a special
duty to use reasonable care for the protection of persons who have
collaborated with it in the arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it
reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collaboration."
Schuster v. City of New York, supra.
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This case marks a milestone in the field of New York municipal
corporation law by giving full effect to the apparent legislative pur-
pose in the passage of the statute waiving the state's immunity from
tort liability. By placing municipalities on the same level as in-
dividuals with regard to the rules governing tort liability, they must
not only perform the duties imposed on them by law, but they must
also act in accordance with the ordinary standards of due care. This
case does not hold that municipalities are called upon to answer in
damages for every loss caused by criminals. Only when persons
have put themselves in a position of danger in order to aid law en-
forcement agencies and actual danger does exist which is known to
the police authorities, does a reciprocal duty arise for the cities to
use reasonable care to protect that person. The result of this case
is predicated upon the well-established common-law principle that in
a just society there shall be a remedy for every wrong between per-
sons. This duty to protect persons aiding the law enforcement
agencies must be upheld in order to encourage persons to co-operate
with these authorities. However, not all states have a statute as
broad as the New York statute which waives the immunity of muni-
cipal corporations. In South Carolina, for instance, it is well estab-
lished law that except as expressly permitted by statute, municipalities
are immune from liability for the negligence of their servants or
agents. The statutes in South Carolina permitting recovery are few
and are strictly construed by the courts. The writer's preference is
in accord with the New York common-law view making munici-
palities subject to the same rules of tort liability as individuals. Be-
cause of the increased tendency of the modern-day municipalities to
engage in much of our country's activities, the personal rights of
individuals will be seriously impaired if our laws do not afford them
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